Foreigner fatigue and Japan’s new populism

Japan’s new government under Prime Minister Takaichi Sanae of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and its partnership with the populist Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai), raises significant concerns for immigrants and foreign residents. Amid a demographic crisis and an environment of rising “foreigner fatigue”, the policy trajectory appears to emphasize control and national identity, rather than inclusion and integration 

Takaichi, who became Japan’s first female prime minister on October 21st this year, is widely recognized as part of the LDP’s conservative, nationalist wing. Her public statements indicate a tougher stance on immigration and foreign land ownership under the banner of national security and public order.

Ishin, with which Takaichi’s party has a ”confidence and supply arrangement”, has proposed placing an upper limit on the proportion of foreign residents in Japan, arguing that increased immigration would lead to social tension. The party further called for stricter control on land acquisition by foreigners, and a tightening of deportation procedures—a call that met Ishin’s coalition partner’s open ears.  

These policy statements come at a time when overtourism and immigration are among the most salient issues in public discourse. Many local communities report frustration with overtourism and what has been termed ”foreigner fatigue”, as visitor numbers and inbound tourism have surged. Kyoto City officials, for instance, recently announced an accommodation tax of up to 10,000 yen per night for foreign tourists. This is just one of many recent policy changes in a wave of restrictive initiatives specifically targeting foreigners. Just earlier this year, the Ministry of Education decided to exclude international students from one of its major scholarship programs. The government is further considering tax increases on departures and visa and entry fees for foreigners. Meanwhile, an exchange initiative between Japanese and African cities was cancelled after a social-media backlash erroneously conflated it with immigration. Such drastic measures show how sensitive the politics surrounding foreigners have already become. 

These developments unfold against the backdrop of Japan’s accelerating demographic decline. In 2025, the population of Japanese citizens fell by over 900 thousand—its largest annual drop on record. At the same time, the number of foreign residents reached a record high of nearly 3.95 million, or just above 3% of the total population.  

Japan’s labor market and social welfare challenges demand foreign labor, yet the current political framing treats foreigners as a social problem.

In this context, the policies signaled by the new coalition suggest a tightening of the regime around foreigners rather than a strengthening of integration. The terminology introduced under former Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru, talking about “orderly and harmonious coexistence” with foreigners, may sound benign but carries a distinct meaning in the Japanese policy discourse. That is, one of foreigners being subject to the norms of the Japanese majority rather than being equal participants in society. For many foreign residents, this means ongoing precariousness. By emphasizing numerical limits, supervision, and restrictions, the new government risks reinforcing the perception of foreigners as guests under supervision rather than fellow citizens. 

For immigrants already in Japan, the implications are noteworthy. A tighter screening regime, stricter enforcement of visa conditions, and narrowing pathways to settlement may reduce security of status and hinder long-term integration. Local governments, under pressure from overtourism and foreigner‐related complaints, may adopt exclusionary measures that go beyond the scope of targeting tourists and also affect foreign residents.  

There is an inherent contradiction. Japan’s labor market and social welfare challenges demand foreign labor, yet the current political framing treats foreigners as a social problem. The result could be a self-perpetuating spiral: fewer foreign workers willing to stay long term, less investment in integration infrastructure, and a public narrative of foreigners as burdens rather than contributors. A sustainable immigration strategy would require not only admission but equal rights, inclusive institutions, language and cultural support, and effective regional adaptation of policy. 

Moreover, the coalition’s emphasis on national pride and identity may contribute further to social divisions. Japan already shows evidence of rising anti-immigrant sentiment, with hostility toward foreigners amplified by media sensationalism, local incidents, and xenophobia spreading and intensifying online. Given the demographic and social imperatives, the question is whether Japan will continue to frame foreigners under control and conditional status or whether it will shift to genuine inclusion and integration. The current signs point toward the former. Unless the government pairs border control with robust inclusion policies, the risk is that Japan’s demographic problems will worsen rather than be ameliorated. 

In sum, the LDP-Ishin coalition appears willing to sacrifice long-term social cohesion to capitalize on the current salience of foreigner-related issues and secure short-term popular support, seemingly emphasizing subordination over inclusion, control over opportunity, and national identity over group membership. For immigrants and foreign residents in Japan, this suggests a challenging environment ahead. Japan needs more than just guests—it needs partners. How the new government decides to move forward will determine whether this moment becomes a possibility for transformation or a lost opportunity in the long run.