Recent public debate in Japan has grown markedly more heated around foreign crime, driven in part by political rhetoric, rising arrests of non-Japanese individuals, and proposals by governing party factions to tighten controls on foreign residents. In one highly publicized moment before the LDP’s October 2025 leadership contest, then-candidate Sanae Takaichi pointed to alleged misconduct by “foreign visitors” in Nara as part of a broader critique of foreign crime and law enforcement. Local authorities had no clear evidence of such incidents, but the remarks nonetheless resonated on the campaign trail and drew criticism for conflating tourist behavior with broader anxieties about foreign residents. Yet, a careful examination of the evidence shows that much of these anxieties do not align with long-term crime trends, nor do they reflect the complex socioeconomic realities of migrant populations in Japan.
It is true that the number of arrests of foreign nationals involved in crimes has increased in recent years. For example, police data indicate that 15,541 criminal law and 9,352 so-called “special law” offenses involving foreign nationals were logged in 2023, up roughly 20% and 31% respectively from the previous year. However, this rise must be seen in context. Japan’s overall crime rate, including offenses committed by Japanese nationals, remains far below the peaks seen in the early 2000s. The Ministry of Justice’s own crime whitepapers show that while reported crimes ticked up in 2022 and 2023, total figures are still a fraction of earlier decades, and the increase is overwhelmingly driven by petty theft and other minor offences. Arrests of foreigners mirror this same pattern both in type and in scale. It is therefore difficult to claim that foreign crime has increased disproportionately or that foreigners are the main driver of Japan’s modest uptick in reported crime.
It is also important to note that “foreigner” does not necessarily mean “foreign resident.” According to the crime whitepapers, around two-thirds of all arrests for criminal offenses and more than 85% for special law offenses in 2023 involved non-residents. In other words, the majority of arrests involving non-Japanese are of non-residents. Moreover, over 80% of special law offenses are violations of immigration law such as undocumented immigration or overstaying. Taken together, these figures indicate that foreign residents not only commit fewer criminal offenses but are also far less likely to be involved in visa-related violations. The perception of a sweeping public safety threat from foreign residents is thus not supported by the data.
The link between legal status and criminal activity has been documented in the broader migration literature. Research in other national contexts shows that immigrants with secure legal status are significantly less likely to commit crime. Conversely, individuals who lack legal status, such as visa overstayers or undocumented workers, are already in a position of illegality. Unable to work legally or access public support, they are more likely to appear in crime statistics due to their precarious situation, and not necessarily because of any inherent criminal propensity. Demographic factors further explain apparent differences as migrant populations tend to be younger and more male-dominated than Japan’s aging native population—characteristics that correlate with slightly higher offense rates. Broad policy responses that fail to distinguish between status-related violations and ordinary criminal acts risk conflating fundamentally different phenomena.
Another factor overlooked in the public debate is how enforcement practices shape arrest statistics. Differences in appearance, unfamiliarity with local regulations, and conspicuous minority status can make foreign nationals more visible to a police force that already tends to equate immigration and crime. A growing body of reports highlights patterns of racial profiling by police, where individuals are stopped and questioned based on their foreign appearance rather than objective behavior. Surveys show foreign residents are contacted by police far more often than Japanese nationals, and plaintiffs in a lawsuit from 2024 allege repeated unjustified stops. This systemic pattern of enforcement increases the likelihood that, in disputes involving a Japanese and a foreign person, police interventions fall on the foreigner even when fault is ambiguous. This is exacerbated as the police force is not sufficiently equipped to deal with cultural and language barriers.
Japan remains one of the safest countries in the world in terms of serious violent crime. Murders, kidnappings, and other grave offenses occur at very low rates compared to most other industrialized nations. Even within this low base, serious crimes committed by foreigners are extremely rare. Overstating the issue and framing it as a “foreigner problem” risks diverting public attention from Japan’s genuine, and far more difficult, challenges: Demographic decline, labor shortages, and the need to integrate a growing international population.
This focus on foreigners, however, has proven politically useful. In the run-up to the 2025 LDP leadership election, several candidates adopted tougher stances on immigration and non-Japanese residents, promising stricter measures against visa overstays and unruly foreign tourists. This reflects a broader political trend as public unease over foreign crime has become a convenient rallying point not only for ruling party contenders but also for right-wing challengers such as Sanseito.
Instead of exploiting fear of foreign crime for short-term political gain, Japan’s policymakers should focus on the structural issues that truly matter, that is regularizing legal status, expanding language support, ensuring equitable law enforcement, and promoting fair participation in social systems. As Japan’s dependence on migrant labor continues to grow, sustainable public safety and social cohesion will depend not on exclusion and suspicion, but on inclusion, transparency, and equal treatment under the law.
Stefan Aichholzer is a PhD candidate at Osaka University and a former JSPS Research Fellow. He holds an MA in Human Sciences from Osaka University and a BA in Japanese Studies from the University of Vienna. His dissertation examines interethnic marriage and the reproduction of ethnic hierarchies in Japan. His broader research interest centers on immigrant integration, intergroup relations, and ethnic diversity in Japan.
