Japanese politics may be reaching an inflection point in which major change is on the horizon.
Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and his ruling coalition government suffered a historic defeat in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election last month, and headed into the Upper House election with polls across the board questioning whether they will hold on to a majority in the Upper House, having lost their majority in the Lower House last year.
This year’s ordinary Diet session has laid bare the challenges of minority government rule, slowing down legislative progress and forcing the ruling parties to make a series of concessions to enact the fiscal year annual budget – a situation unimaginable until last October’s defeat in the Lower House election. These challenges will be compounded if the ruling parties lose control over both Houses.
Meanwhile, the rise of populist challenger parties – the centrist Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) and right-wing Sanseito – has opened up discussions over a realignment of the ruling coalition and even a potential change in government, with opinion polls in recent months suggesting that a new arrangement may not be out of the question.
These changing political dynamics in Japan merit exploring the possibility of a major realignment, including the possibility of a union between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) — a “grand coalition” that has become the subject of interest among policymakers and the media since the start of the new year.
A History of Alignment and Realignment
The LDP has a history of realigning itself with other political parties in order to maintain power. For instance, the second Nakasone Cabinet formed in 1983 was the product of a coalition with the New Liberal Club — a group of former LDP members who left the party — following the loss of a majority in the Lower House election that year.
Other prominent examples include the LDP-Socialist-Sakigake coalition formed in 1994 and the LDP-Komeito-Liberal Party coalition formed in 1999, which subsequently became the LDP-Komeito coalition government as it exists today in 2003. In both cases, the recurring theme was the loss of a majority in the Lower House that forced the LDP to find partners to survive.
In the former case, the LDP took on the junior role in a Cabinet led by the Socialist Party’s Murayama Tomiichi following the first transfer of power to opposition forces in 1993. In the latter, the LDP formed a coalition first with the Liberal Party and then with Komeito to recapture a majority in the Lower House following consecutive defeats in both Houses in prior years.
The pattern of behavior suggests that the LDP is willing to partner up with other parties regardless of political alignment in times of desperation. The Socialists were the LDP’s long-time rival and the opposite ideological pole for much of the pre-1993 period. Komeito’s Buddhist roots put it squarely on the opposite end of the spectrum on core policies on national security, constitutional revision, and other related matters at the core of nation building.
A unique strength of the LDP has been its flexibility to adopt policies not necessarily associated with the core conservative principles enshrined in the party’s ideology. If the pattern holds, consecutive defeats in the Lower House (October 2024) and Upper House (summer 2025) could force the LDP to explore its options, including a coalition with the main opposition party.
Is the Situation Ripe for a “Grand Coalition”?
Interest in a grand coalition gained traction at the beginning of the year, when Ishiba said on a radio program that a partnership with the CDP was “possible” and not out of the realm of possibilities. Indeed, minority rule has come with its fair share of challenges, including ceding control over parts of the Diet agenda and making compromises on legislative matters like the annual budget and high-cost out-of-pocket medical treatment. A grand coalition would internalize these discussions and return control over the legislative process to the government.
At a glance, a grand coalition could be mutually beneficial if the LDP is able to maintain power and if the CDP is able to regain the relevancy it has lost in policy making vis-à-vis the ruling parties and surging parties like the DPFP and Sanseito, which have overtaken or matched the CDP’s support rate in recent polls. There are several other potential benefits to a coalition.
First, from a purely numeric standpoint, combining the two main parties would secure a comfortable supermajority in the Lower House and make it easier to pass legislation. It would also blunt any momentum the opposition may have to seek Ishiba’s removal, as a no-confidence motion requiring a majority vote of present lawmakers in the chamber would become mathematically impossible.
Second, minority rule delayed legislative progress and required enormous amounts of political capital to move matters forward. As Komeito Chief Representative Saito Tetsuo noted on April 24, a majority-ruled Cabinet is “necessary to make quick and accurate decisions in a very fast-changing global political situation.” This is especially true as a brewing U.S.-China trade war and other geopolitical tensions require agile responses from governments, not a prolonged squabble over domestic political issues.
Third, broad policy alignment between the LDP and CDP, as well as the personal relationship between Ishiba and Noda Yoshihiko — both at one point members of the New Frontier Party — could prove to be a catalyst that brings together the two rival parties. In the face of a “national crisis” in the form of the U.S. tariffs — which prompted Noda to hold back on submitting a no-confidence motion at the end of the Diet session in June — the leaders may find that the timing and justification for a new union may be right. Ishiba and Noda also agree on broad strokes of foreign, defense, and economic policy, representing the more centrist blocs within their respective parties.
A Distant Dream for Now?
While the walls may be closing in on Ishiba and the LDP, history suggests that a grand coalition is likely to remain a pipe dream even if the situation were ripe for it.
The failed 2007 grand coalition between the LDP and Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is the closest lesson we have on how leader-level agreements do not necessarily translate to party-wide support for an arrangement. That attempt at coalition was deemed “undemocratic” and confusing given electoral competition (many lawmakers would be find themselves competing against a new coalition partner in their electoral district).
Though there are similarities with the current situation — such as both then-LDP President Fukuda Yasuo and Ishiba characterizing the political situation as a “national crisis” and leader level rapport — the failed negotiations ultimately resulted in a confrontational DPJ and a series of short-lived “revolving door” prime ministers from both parties, a situation which only ended with Abe Shinzo’s return in 2012.
A glaring omission in the argument for a grand coalition is the state of domestic politics today. Opposition parties like the CDP have framed their identity and policies in juxtaposition to the LDP. Joining forces would run the risk of being viewed as hypocritical by voters and benefit the LDP at the expense of losing a growing voter base that seems fed up with the corruption and disconnectedness from the public embodied by the ruling coalition.
Another challenge lies in convincing both sides that a grand coalition will stand the test of time. Past iterations have been short-lived or have failed altogether, making it a hard sell to persuade lawmakers and party supporters that a new arrangement will provide a breakthrough from stagnation and not create new problems that lead to further political paralysis.
While there may be broad stroke alignment on policy, the current Diet session has exposed stark differences on policy items, especially those related to social issues such as the question of separate surnames for married couples, or “populist” economic issues such as whether or not to introduce a consumption tax cut in response to U.S. tariffs and soaring prices at home. Fundamentally, the different bases of political support — the LDP drawing its base from conservative organizations and industry, and the CDP from labor — may prove an insurmountable challenge neither has the desire nor the ability to overcome.
The Path Forward
At this point in time, the most likely scenario is that neither side sees a grand coalition as the most viable solution.
For its part, the LDP is likely to see a coalition with the DPFP or the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai) as a relatively realistic option compared to negotiating terms with the CDP. On the other hand, the CDP may like the chances of the opposition collectively cutting into the ruling coalition’s majority in the Upper House and not see any benefit in prolonging the LDP’s reign as it pursues a change in government.
And while Ishiba and Noda may personally have a rapport and open discussions on a possible coalition, the two leaders do not command sufficiently complete control over their respective parties to push through expected resistance to such a move. Put simply, a grand coalition would be too taxing and is not the hill the two leaders would be willing to die on.
However, the results of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly and Upper House elections in the summer, coupled with the tariff negotiations and the lingering possibility of a no-confidence motion at the beginning of the fall extraordinary Diet session, may create a scenario in which the LDP is scrambling to maintain power and the CDP not strong enough to usher in a change in government. In such a scenario, a weakened LDP and a CDP looking to wrest relevancy back from other opposition parties may yet partner up to create a new normal in Japanese politics.
The LDP will be in a tough position in any scenario requiring the addition of a new coalition partner, as it would be in a weaker negotiating position vis-à-vis the potential partner, especially if the Upper House election ends in defeat and potential partners gain momentum.
From Ishiba and the LDP’s perspective, the best of the worst-case scenarios may be to seek an “Obuchi style” arrangement in which shrewd negotiations and concessions create a stable, working relationship to push forth legislative matters. In other words, this would entail solidifying the engagements made during the current Diet session while finding the right balance between making concessions to other parties to make progress and appeasing internal frustrations over the new dynamics requiring a more compromising attitude from the long dominant party. The results of the Upper House election will change the probabilities of these outcomes, though both parties will face significant internal resistance to joining forces. Time will tell whether the notion of a grand coalition remains a mere curiosity for politics wonks, or a surprising new reality for Japan’s governance.
Rintaro Nishimura is a Tokyo-based Associate in The Asia Group’s Japan practice, where he researches and analyzes domestic political shifts, economic security, and technology policy developments. He was previously an Analyst in the Japan practice at the Washington, D.C. office. He graduated with a MA in Asian Studies (MASIA) at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, focusing his studies on the U.S.-Japan alliance, economic security in the Indo-Pacific, and Japanese domestic politics. He has extensive writing experience, having published in the Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, Nikkei Asia, The Diplomat,The National Interest, Tokyo Review, and Asia Tech Observer. He has also been quoted in Reuters, Bloomberg, Voice of America, Al Jazeera, CNBC, and Taiwan Plus News. He can be found on Twitter (@RinNishimura) and http://rintaronishimura.com.
