Japanese politics has hit a major inflection point.
Takaichi Sanae has become the first woman to be named prime minister. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) over two decades-long coalition with Komeito has come to an end.
The chaos that ensued in the aftermath of the dissolution of the coalition resulted in a new partnership between the LDP and the Japan Innovation Party (Nippon Ishin no Kai). The so-called “confidence and supply arrangement” is nowhere near as stable as the LDP-Komeito coalition and puts the LDP’s post-war dominance at risk.
New Prime Minister Takaichi’s success as the nation’s leader rests in part on her ability to navigate the new partnership in an increasingly competitive legislative environment. Failure to do so will delay policy progress and directly affect the popular support she and her minority government have enjoyed in the first few weeks since taking over.
An Imperfect Partnership
The new partnership between the LDP and Ishin is considered a “confidence and supply” arrangement, in which the Kansai based center-right party votes with the LDP on no-confidence motions and other key votes to prop up the government but has no representation in government or say in Cabinet decisions, and has the freedom to vote as it wants on legislation.
The lack of formal integration into the LDP government makes it an unstable arrangement compared to the LDP-Komeito coalition. Should the LDP fail to meet Ishin’s expectations on policy, the party can quickly end the partnership and vote Takaichi out of office with other opposition parties.
The two parties signed a policy agreement on October 20, just a day before Takaichi was voted in as prime minister in the Diet. The unusually high set of demands in twelve policy areas—including three non-negotiables including the second capital initiative, lowering social insurance fees, and reducing the total number of Diet members by 10 percent—gives Ishin a level of power over Takaichi and the LDP, as it needs Ishin’s votes to get closer to a majority in the Diet.
Though both party leaders explained that the union was born out of a “common national vision,” the two parties do not align completely on some policy areas like taxation and political reform. Perhaps understanding this, Ishin chose an imperfect partnership over jumping into a fully-fledged coalition arrangement, choosing to test the LDP’s commitment to the partnership before exploring a full union.
The LDP was in no position to be picky, as Komeito had announced its withdrawal from the coalition a week-and-a-half before the prime minister vote. Ishin was therefore able to raise the bar, maximizing its gains while ensuring the imperfect partnership served as a safeguard in case the LDP decides to renege on promises like before.
Legislative Coordination as First Test
The period between late October and March 2026 will serve as the first litmus test for the LDP-Ishin partnership, as these first few months of the Takaichi era will see tough deliberations on key budgetary and legislative items in two separate Diet sessions.
Takaichi must first get through the extraordinary Diet session until mid-December, where the government has to negotiate and compromise on the FY 2025 supplementary budget to finance a stimulus package centered around much-needed inflation relief measures. Getting the budget enacted and inflation relief implemented promptly will help keep the public satisfied with the new government. On the contrary, failure to do so would put Takaichi on shaky ground.
During this Diet session, Takaichi and the LDP will have to undergo two sets of negotiations—first with Ishin and then with the opposition parties. With Ishin, the LDP will have to show its willingness to carry out the policy agreement. Ishin co-leader Fujita Fumitake has already warned that failure to meet objectives such as submitting a bill to reduce the number of Diet members will result in termination of the partnership agreement.
Even with Ishin satisfied, the two parties must then work to convince at least two Lower House lawmakers and five Upper House lawmakers to pass any matter by majority vote through the Diet. This will be a policy-by-policy process in which the parties will need to negotiate with different parties to achieve different sets of policies all the while navigating demands that may bloat the budget.
The LDP and Ishin need to swiftly institutionalize an internal consultation process to ensure seamless communication of policy priorities and progress on negotiations with other parties. Without a clear process in place like the one between the LDP and Komeito established over decades, the LDP could face a two-fronted battle and lose control over next year’s budget formulation too, and therefore, government policy implementation.
The Election Dilemma
Another major challenge for the LDP and Ishin is election cooperation. While Takaichi does not need to dissolve the Lower House and call a general election until 2028, the temptation to call one while her approval is high will only get stronger if the legislative process faces complications.
The imperfect nature of the partnership has meant that election cooperation has been shelved for future discussion. The LDP and Komeito shared what was viewed as a win-win partnership, in which the LDP gained 15,000 to 20,000 votes per single-member district from Soka Gakkai (buddhist sect behind Komeito) and Komeito “punched above its weight” on policy matters. The two parties rarely fought over districts, as the LDP focused on single-member seats while Komeito focused on proportional representation seats.
The LDP and Ishin do not have such a complementary relationship, as the two parties competed in 155 single-member districts in last year’s Lower House election. Coordinating on districts—essentially avoiding competition between the parties—will be challenging given established local rivalries especially in the Kansai region and Ishin’s desire to break out beyond the Kansai region and expand its presence nationally even in competition with the LDP.
For the LDP, losing the Komeito bloc vote will also cause issues for its most vulnerable candidates, with Ishin unlikely to serve as a substitute in garnering votes. Failure to coordinate with Ishin may result in competition between the two parties and with opposition parties. Some projections suggest that the LDP could lose up to 20 percent of its seats in the Lower House without Komeito and perhaps more if it cannot cooperate with Ishin.
Meanwhile, Ishin has taken a gamble by siding with the LDP, a party that has been thoroughly punished over the last few major election cycles for its political fundraising scandal. While being considered an effective “ruling” party may help win over new voters, attaching itself too close to a scandal-tainted party and losing its identity as an alternative populist party to the so-called establishment parties like the LDP may result in a loss of votes.
The parties have decided to prioritize trust building over sensitive subjects like election cooperation for now. But this issue will rear its head as early as next year if Takaichi decides to call a snap election to shore up public support.
What the Future Holds
Takaichi entered office with much fanfare and strong public support, seemingly winning back a healthy number of conservatives who had distanced themselves from the LDP that had strayed into a more moderate line of thinking.
The LDP’s partnership with Ishin is a double edged sword. On the one hand, it will satisfy the conservative base that likes Takaichi and Ishin’s tilt toward a “Japan First” type ideology. On the other hand, it runs the risk of alienating moderate independents who view the new government as having excessive right-wing nationalist tendencies.
The verdict is still out on a new equilibrium in Japanese politics. But one thing is clear: the LDP has held onto power by swapping out Komeito with Ishin. The party has done what it does best—doing whatever it takes to stay in power.
The question now is whether the new arrangement will hold. The longevity of the Takaichi administration rests on a stable LDP-Ishin partnership.
Rintaro Nishimura is a Tokyo-based Senior Associate in The Asia Group’s Japan practice, where he researches and analyzes domestic political shifts, economic security, and technology policy developments. He is a co-founder of the U.S.-ROK-Japan Next-Gen Study Group, a platform for young professionals to regularly discuss issues pertaining to the trilateral relationship. He graduated with a MA in Asian Studies (MASIA) at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, focusing his studies on the U.S.-Japan alliance, economic security in the Indo-Pacific, and Japanese domestic politics. He has extensive writing experience, having published in the Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, Nikkei Asia, The Interpreter, The Diplomat, The National Interest, Tokyo Review, and Asia Tech Observer. He has also been quoted in BBC, CNN, Reuters, Bloomberg, Nikkei Asia, Voice of America, Al Jazeera, and CNBC. He can be found on Twitter (@RinNishimura) and http://rintaronishimura.com.
